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ABSTRACT 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are arrangements between government and private 
sector entities for the purpose of providing public infrastructure, community facilities 
and related services. PPP infrastructure development can take place at a regional level 
on a large scale, such as a cross country tunnel construction or on a small scale at an 
urban level such as city waste water treatment and sewerage rehabilitation. The 
purpose of this article is to identify issues and challenges in the area of public-private 
partnerships for infrastructure provision and finance at the urban and national levels in 
Southeast Asia. More thought will be given to discuss essential features of regulatory 
and legal frameworks required to support public and private sectors to effectively 
deliver urban infrastructure services. These include building legal frameworks and 
institutions at the outset; introducing sound regulations to protect private sector 
investment; using contractual safeguards against potentially disputable matters; and 
implementing governance and accountability frameworks.  It also offers some insights 
into the regulatory and surveillance machinery required at a national-urban PPP 
setting to ensure effectiveness, fairness and openness for executing urban infrastructure 
development projects. Reviews of impediments to successful PPPs have indicated 
several prevailing issues and challenges. Urban local authorities often encounter 
overlapping regulations and still need adequate clarity on their roles and authority 
levels. For central governments, there is a real need for a comprehensive and consistent 
regulatory framework and a more streamlined process for implementation of PPP 
projects. 
Keywords - ASEAN Countries, Public-Private Partnerships, Urban Infrastructure 
Development 
INTRODUCTION 
In Southeast Asian countries, urban areas have been developed with rapid economic 
growth and expansion of population. The economy of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) experienced an average growth of 5.9 percent from 2003 to 2008 (The 
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ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). The total population in 2008 was about 580 million and 
projected to rise to 650 million by 2020, with more than half living in urban areas 
(United Nations, 2007). The urban population in the region has been steadily increasing 
from 31.6 percent of the total population in 1990 to about 47 percent in 2008 (The 
ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). However, due to this rising population in major cities, the 
development of urban infrastructure and public services such as sewage systems, 
wastewater treatment facilities, and public transportation network has become 
insufficient and less effective, causing serious problems to the quality of life of 
residents and obstructing the sustainable growth of the ASEAN countries. 
Since introduction of decentralization efforts in several ASEAN countries in 1990s, 
many local governments have been responsible for the delivery of urban services.  
However, their finances and administrative autonomy remain a challenging issue. The 
ability of local governments to raise revenue and provide adequate services continues to 
deteriorate as city populations grow while their administrations are still trapped in the 
bureaucratic traditions and have less capable staff. 
Facing budgetary constraints and recognizing their inability to provide infrastructure 
services efficiently, governments in many countries have been rapidly adopting neo-
liberal approaches and a market-based economy. This has led to radical changes in the 
characteristics and the respective roles of the public and private sectors. Coping with the 
new market economy requires governments to reduce the size of the public sector and 
give a greater role to a more dynamic private sector under public-private partnership 
schemes.    
The purpose of this article is to identify issues and challenges in the area of public-
private partnerships for infrastructure provision and finance at the urban and national 
levels in Southeast Asia. More thought will be given to discuss essential features of 
regulatory and legal frameworks required to support public and private sectors to 
effectively deliver urban infrastructure services.   
PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT IN ASEAN - SOME LESSONS LEARNED 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are arrangements between government and private 
sector entities for the purpose of providing public infrastructure, community facilities 
and related services. PPP infrastructure development can take place at a regional level 
on a large scale, such as a cross country tunnel construction or on a small scale at an 
urban area such as city waste water treatment and sewerage rehabilitation. These 
partnership arrangements can provide a broad umbrella to shelter and protect the public 
interest while bringing investment potential and added value from the private sector.  
Governments in the ASEAN countries have used the public-private partnership 
mechanism extensively, partly because they suffer from budgetary constraints and that 
the private sector can step in to undertake projects with its technical expertise and 
resources to secure financing. This unfolds in the critical case of urban infrastructure 
development, where in exchange for a building license, the private investor promises to 
  
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 12, Iss. 1, 2011 
 www.ipmr.net  50 IPMR
build public infrastructure like roads and sewer systems that the local government 
cannot effectively accomplish. In addition, decentralization has significantly 
empowered and given autonomy to local governments to control and supervise their 
private partners’ performance by utilizing or manipulating the permit or licensing 
system. Therefore, the success or failure of urban development relies to some extent on 
whether the private investor rights, as derived from government licenses and permits, 
are secure in order for the investors to continue to invest at adequate levels to support 
the urban infrastructure development projects. 
Some success stories of PPPs in ASEAN countries are in urban water supply and 
distribution. Traditionally, the public sector has been responsible for the management of 
water services, but in recent times, it has been argued that it lacks the capability that is 
needed to provide efficient services in a time of increasing demand. The provision of 
water supply by several municipal governments has been marred by inefficiencies, 
especially due to low coverage, high non-revenue water (NRW) levels, intermittent 
supply, and poor water quality. Greater involvement of the private sector in water 
supply and distribution, through innovative approaches like Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) has become one of the solutions. Examples include the private sector 
participation in urban water supply through the concessions in metropolitan Manila and 
Jakarta, which have been in place for almost a decade, serving a population of 20 
million people.  
In Manila, two concessions were awarded in 1997 to cover two areas. The Western 
concession, operated by Benpres-Suez was the larger and covered most developed 
portions of the city, with a total population of about 7 million people. The smaller 
Eastern concession, operated by Ayala-United Utilities covered about 4 million 
residents. Even though the implementation of the two concessions faced major 
difficulties from the beginning caused by the Asian financial crisis, access to piped 
water in Manila later expanded significantly during the decade. From 1997 to 2006, the 
zone coverage significantly expanded from 67 percent to 86 percent for the Western 
concession and from 49 percent to 94 percent for the Eastern concession (Philippe, 
2009) whereas the average water coverage for the national urban area grew moderately 
from 46 percent to 58 percent. An estimated 4 million people gained access to piped 
water in Manila during the period 1997–2006.  
Access to piped water in Jakarta was even lower. Before the two concessions, Suez for 
the Western zone and Thames Water for the Eastern zone, were awarded in 1998, water 
supply covered on average 30 percent of the population. Many city dwellers obtained 
water from private wells. Between 1998 and 2005, the two concessionaires added 
210,000 water connections to the system, providing access for an additional 1.7 million 
people. Access to piped water in Jakarta’s Western zone went up from 32 percent to 50 
percent, and from 57 percent to 67 percent in the Eastern zone (Philippe, 2009) whereas 
national urban water coverage stagnated at a low 30 percent in the same period. 
However, it was difficult to expand more access to water supply in Jakarta. Many 
households were unwilling to pay a connection fee plus periodic bills because they had 
already invested in pumping equipment and were not paying any extraction charge for 
the water they were getting from their wells. 
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The performance of PPPs in water supply and distribution in Indonesia and the Philippines 
has demonstrated achievable success, with more expansion of coverage, improved 
operational efficiency, and better quality of service. Despite some problems, the 
concessionaires have obtained very encouraging results. They have successfully re-
tendered and are now gaining considerable success in the area of high non-revenue 
water (NRW) management. 
It is vital for a successful PPP to have an effective procurement and financing strategy 
in place, including regulatory frameworks that identify roles and responsibilities for the 
local governments and the private partners at the outset. There are some lessons learned 
from the PPP urban infrastructure development projects in countries such as Malaysia and 
Thailand indicating failures, mainly because of the lack of adequate guarantees for the long-
term investment return and the impact of political intervention at the local governmental 
level.  
PPP failures caused by economic risks and inadequate financial guarantees 
Examining experience in more details shows that there are a number of features that 
raise the risk profile of urban infrastructure development for private investors. An urban 
sewerage rehabilitation project illustrates some of the PPP pitfalls caused by economic 
risks and inadequate financial guarantees. In Malaysia, the provision of sewerage 
services was privatized to Indah Water Konsortium (IWK) in 1993. This Malaysia 
example is interesting in that the sanitation program, while providing a core urban 
infrastructure service, has been managed through a national program. The central 
government has provided grants for sewerage infrastructure. There were 144 local 
authorities in the country and IWK has taken over the management and provision of 
sewerage services in 84 local authorities (Abidin, 2004). This project arose from 
concerns over local governments’ weak technical and financial capability in the face of 
poorly maintained facilities and rising demands for better sewerage services. An 
unsolicited proposal was brought to the central government, and approved rapidly, in 
1994. Investments and the level of service improved dramatically in the immediate 
term. As the demand for effective sanitation increased, IWK turned to other private 
companies to build wastewater management systems. However, even before the 
economic crisis in 1997, consumers objected to the tariffs imposed (Annex 2006). IWK 
faced problem with revenue collection because many consumers refused to pay at the 
imposed rates. Consumers felt that the tariffs charged were too high. They perceived 
that the price of a public utility had increased following the transfer of the service from 
the government to the private sector. The tariff structure originally stipulated in the 
agreements was then suspended without compensation for the private investors, and a 
new tariff structure was established in 1997. In addition, IWK discovered that the 
rehabilitation required more investment than anticipated. As a result, the government 
felt obliged to provide substantial financial support to IWK, including a long term soft 
loan package.  In conclusion, although the government succeeded in attracting private 
involvement, the structure of guarantees provided, and the underestimated risks 
involved in the project were such that both the capital mobilized and the physical 
achievements of the projects were much less than originally expected.  
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PPP failures caused by undue political intervention 
Experience in ASEAN countries has revealed that the PPP landscape can be hampered 
significantly by undue political intervention in the policy decision process. For example, 
politicians have made promises to support the development of a particular project but 
continued lobbying against the development of a similar project backed by the opposing 
politicians. Such political competition may produce unhealthy result for the economic 
functioning of a city.  
A prime example of this is in the transport sector in Bangkok (Valentine, 2008). There 
are two rail systems currently operating in the city. The first one owned by the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Authority (BMA) is the BTS Sky-train which began its operation in 1999 
under the PPP concession of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model managed by the 
Bangkok Mass Transit System (BTS) Public Company. The second one is the 
underground electric mass rapid transit system called the MRT (Mass Rapid Transit) 
which was operated by the Mass Rapid Transit Authority (MRTA), a State-Owned- 
Enterprise under the supervision of the Ministry of Transportation. The BTS Sky-train 
is managed by a local government authority within the central Bangkok area whereas 
the MRTA is authorized to operate the underground MRT Systems within the Greater 
Bangkok area and the nearby provinces. In 2008, the BTS and its expansion plans were 
attached to local politicians who were in fierce contest with their opponents in the 
central government, who favored the other rail MRT line. These opponents considered 
that the best way to promote the extensions for the MRT concessions was to prohibit the 
extensions of the BTS network.  
This political tension has caused expansion to both the public rail MRT and BTS 
systems to serve the residents of Bangkok extremely slow in developing. It has 
obviously led to negative implications for the city’s infrastructure development in terms 
of mobilizing finance and accelerating private participation on project investments. 
ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF  REGULATORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
TO SUPPORT PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT 
The infrastructures mainly needed by developing countries to support their economic 
activities are those related to transportation, energy, water, and most recently, 
telecommunications. However, high capital investment costs and lack of technology can 
impede infrastructure development. Many developing countries cannot afford such 
development without affecting other economic activities. Considerable attention has 
been paid to enforce regulations for promotion of private involvement in public 
infrastructure services, with a view to encouraging private firms to participate and 
thereby mobilize private capital into public work projects. Improvement of program 
performance, cost efficiencies, better service provision, and appropriate allocation of 
risks and accountabilities have also been identified as factors opening avenues for 
public-private partnership in designing, constructing, operating, maintaining and 
financing infrastructure development through management and lease contracts, 
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concessions and divestitures. There are some enabling factors of regulation that are 
essential for private investment in infrastructure development. These include the setting 
of a regulatory framework and institutions at the outset; sound regulations to protect 
private sector investment; contractual safeguards against potentially disputable matters; 
and governance and accountability frameworks.   
Institutional and regulatory setting 
Regulation is a key element to maintain a competitive market discipline on public 
infrastructure services. While many governments in developing countries have already 
signed their first demonstration public-private partnership contracts, most have not yet 
designed the legal and regulatory framework for monitoring the performance of private 
contractors and for ensuring contractual compliance. Experience in these countries 
confirms the importance of putting a sound regulatory framework in place before 
implementing public-private partnership programs (IP3, 2000). A regulatory system 
should be established as soon as possible to define clear rules for financial performance, 
provide practical experience to the staff responsible for their implementation, and 
provide assurance to the private sector that the regulatory system includes protection 
from expropriation, arbitration of commercial disputes, and respect for contract 
agreements. In turn, the regulatory system will increase benefits to the government by 
achieving better and more informed decision making, improved performance, and by 
raising efficiency and accountability (The World Bank, 1994).   
Investment protection 
Investor security is critically important. Regulation is also useful in protecting the 
interests of private investors by preventing direct or indirect expropriation of investment 
capital. For example, regulation in public-private partnerships can act as a buffer against 
political interference from governmental bodies in pricing decisions. This buffer 
function is particularly important, as government objectives for political or social 
reasons may act as a disincentive to investment and, indeed, may not even be in the 
consumer interest (The World Bank, 1994). In developing countries with limited 
histories of private participation, investors with doubts about the safety of investments 
will either require very high returns or not invest. The only way for these countries to be 
successful in attracting private capital is to establish a regulatory regime that reduces 
this risk and protects private sector investment (Pongsiri, 2005).  
Contractual safeguard 
The financial and other resources of private and state enterprises are always limited. 
Projects developed as public-private partnerships are mostly based on risk sharing and a 
security package of interrelated contracts between the two parties (IP3, 2000). 
Consequently, many developing and emerging market economies require effective 
models on how best to design and establish legal frameworks for contract compliance 
and performance monitoring for public-private partnerships. On the one hand, the 
private sector needs a great deal of certainty and protection against unforeseeable 
changes, as the economic and financial costs of poorly designed, drafted and negotiated 
agreements are tremendous and can jeopardize entire public-private partnership 
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programs (Pongsiri, 2003). The establishment of a transparent and sound regulatory 
framework is a necessary precursor to private sector participation in a public private 
partnership. On the other hand, governments need regulation to ensure that essential 
partnerships operate efficiently and optimize the resources available to them in line with 
broader policy objectives, ranging from social policy to a policy for environmental 
protection (The World Bank, 1994: 57-9). However, over regulation and contractual 
safeguards can restrain economic growth and hinder the private sector’s ability to 
remain competitive in the market (Lundqvist, 1988).  
Governance and accountability framework 
Private investors will be kept away and will seek a more hospitable place to invest if 
regulation is unlimited in scope, unclear in operation, inclined toward micro-
management, and lacks good governance. The regulatory regime must be limited, 
transparent, fair and consistent, and the government must always keep its promises. 
Private investors are cautious not only of expropriation but also of many small 
regulatory actions that together constitute incremental expropriation, taking away the 
private partner’s option of legitimate recovery of costs and of profits proportional to the 
risks undertaken. Private investors must be convinced that the government, as a prudent 
partner, will commit to good governance to protect private investments and will not use 
regulation as a direct or indirect mechanism for “administration expropriation’’. Even if 
public-private partnerships appear to reduce costs, they cannot be defined as a success, 
if their regulation results in the need for more government oversight and expensive 
monitoring (Sparer, 1999). 
Public-private partnerships also involve sharing or transferring a measure of 
responsibility and control of operations. This may cause shifts in accountability 
arrangements, creating new responsibility hierarchies and reporting requirements for 
public sector managers. While governments have been largely preoccupied with 
political accountability through the electoral process, public-private partnerships open 
new channels of accountability. In arrangements where the government still retains 
ultimate or partial accountability, government partners must ensure the respective 
accountability of their partners through the use of sound formal agreements (Pongsiri, 
2002). 
There are also new accountability demands on the private participants in a partnership, 
as they are required to disclose information about partnership related activities, 
including expenditures to their partners and the public (Pongsiri, 2004). Problems that 
arise as a result of shifts in accountabilities can be avoided, if appropriate arrangements 
are put in place toward clear governing regulations. According to the government’s 
viewpoint, a well-defined regulatory framework is essential, if the private partners 
ideologically and financially oppose seeing themselves as having additional 
accountabilities to the public interest (Hassan, 1996; Colton et.al., 1997). 
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REGULATORY AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AT                                                  
A NATIONAL-URBAN PPP SETTING 
Although the concept of public-private partnerships is becoming increasingly common 
as a means of delivering urban infrastructure services, the level of private sector 
involvement is not yet sufficient in ASEAN countries. More importantly, a well-defined 
regulatory framework for partnerships is more an idea than a reality at present. What 
most public and private organizations have found instead is that the implementation of a 
regulatory framework in their partnerships has apparently created a number of 
prevailing issues that are in need of clarification.  
PPPs bring multiple benefits to the stakeholders involved. However, there are 
operational, political and financial risks that are borne by local governments and the 
private companies involved in urban development PPPs. Therefore, central governments 
and local authorities need to ensure that a regulatory and legal framework shall be made 
available to permit, facilitate and secure private investment in public work projects. 
There are some issues and challenges at the national-urban PPP setting that need to be 
addressed to provide sustainable participation by the private sector. 
Overlapping regulation and unclear roles at the urban PPP setting 
Urban PPPs are a commercial transaction between an urban local government and a 
private party whereby the private organization performs an urban function for or on 
behalf of the local government. The private sector, acquiring managerial work or using 
urban property for its own commercial purposes, assumes substantial financial, 
technical and operational risk, and receives a financial benefit in respect of the project. 
Several PPP projects have clearly demonstrated how effective combinations of private 
and public financing and enterprise can significantly strengthen urban service provision 
and improve the well-being of people in urban areas, rural cities and towns. Some other 
benefits to an urban local government are transfers of technology, employment benefits, 
and capacity building.  
Urban authorities are important in the creation or enhancement of this enabling 
environment for PPPs in cities and towns. In many countries these authorities have 
significant governmental autonomy under Private Participation in Public Infrastructure 
Development Acts or similar regulations. They can enter into PPP contracts without 
needing consent from the central government, as long as the costs of the contract can be 
covered by the urban budget. Effective decentralization is therefore a precondition for 
PPP development at the urban level. This means that local authorities must have their 
own resources and taxation authority, and the ability to formulate, negotiate, award, 
implement, supervise, and monitor PPP projects.  
Although urban local officials in general do not have the power to influence positive 
changes in the country’s investment climate, they still need adequate clarity on their 
roles and authority levels, not just to sign contracts, but also to undertake all the other 
tasks related to maintaining the partnership. These would include financial, legal, and 
other areas of public administration. However, in some countries, there is confusion and 
inconsistencies in the regulatory frameworks of central government that inhibit urban 
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government actions to attract capital investment. One of the biggest challenges facing 
urban officials is the legacy of complex and interlinked regulation that often involves 
inherent confusion and duplication. For example, in South Africa, the urban 
infrastructure development projects are governed by the Municipal Systems Act (MSA) 
whereas urban PPPs are regulated by the Municipal Finance Management Act 
(MFMA). Both the MSA and the MFMA require project feasibility studies to be 
undertaken before urban local authorities can proceed with a PPP (Levinsohm and 
Reardon, 2007). Although the studies required by each Act are similar, there are 
discrepancies that can cause confusion. A local authority is faced with the challenge of 
having to satisfy the requirements of both Acts, which is often perceived to be a 
difficult task. Consequently, some urban authorities and the private sector tend to avoid 
using PPPs as a model for infrastructure development in the local government sphere 
because of the cumbersome, complicated, time consuming and inter-related regulatory 
frameworks required to implement a PPP.  In order to accelerate service delivery, urban 
authorities and the private sector decide to shift to other alternative models such as 
conventional procurement and turnkey methods which do not constitute a formal PPP.   
In Thailand, the frameworks underpinning the PPP activities are derived from the Act 
on Private Participation in State Undertaking B.E. 2535 (1992). However, the 
institutional regulatory framework for infrastructure provision and management is a 
fragmented hierarchy where many different bodies across several sectors have assumed 
the various responsibilities of regulation (Valentine, 2008). Certain PPP projects at an 
urban level are covered by their own regulations because the 1992 Act does not 
prescribe the methodology for project valuation or procurement methods. It also does 
not provide a methodology to share the risks and burdens with the private sector when 
projects are not commercially viable. The regulation thus becomes less effective and 
lends itself to frequent clarification and interpretation on several aspects (Susangarn, 
2007).  
Many countries have adopted special arbitration mechanisms at an urban level to solve 
technical, contractual and labor disputes. The arbitration panels can include members of 
the public and the private sectors with supporting guidelines for conflict resolution. This 
would minimize difficulties and tensions that sometimes arise. If there are no special 
arbitration mechanisms, urban authorities themselves need to perform the roles of 
various regulatory authorities, including judicial bodies, when disputes arise. In some 
contracts involving international partners, there can be special clauses for court 
jurisdiction which can be outside of the host country. This is sometimes favored by 
foreign investors, who are unfamiliar with or distrusting of local judicial objectivity and 
processes. As such, urban officials need to understand the implications of these clauses 
in potential contracts and agreements. 
Comprehensive and consistent regulatory framework at the national PPP setting 
At national level, there must be legal, regulatory and administrative processes that 
uphold and respect foreign investors. A comprehensive and consistent framework of 
PPP regulation is very important as it provides a reference point for the main actors in 
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the partnership. There is also a real need for consistency in national PPP policies over 
the long term regardless of changes that may occur in political regime.  
In Thailand, all PPP projects are governed under the Act on Private Participation in 
State Undertaking B.E. 2535 (1992). The Act was intended to provide appropriate 
scrutiny processes for large PPP projects to ensure that the projects are viable and 
contracts are carried out through proper procedures. It was designed at the time of 
enactment to prevent corruption in granting the rights to private investors for operation 
or use of state properties, rather than to delineate the necessary components of sound 
regulatory and institutional framework for PPP projects. As a result, the 1992 Act has 
provided the governmental authorities with inadequate contents and an unclear 
governing framework (Susangarn, 2007). There is a need for an Amendment to provide 
a broader definition of the PPP concept and a more streamlined process for 
implementation of PPP projects.  
A central feature of PPPs is the contractual arrangement. These contracts are often 
highly technical, cumbersome, and have significant legal, financial and technical 
implications. The regulatory framework enforced by the central government thus 
requires a comprehensive guideline for procurement, regulation of prices, conditions of 
arbitration, including the handling of labor disputes. Other related contractual issues that 
may have an impact on the contracting private parties at national level are exchange 
rates, ability to transfer profits, taxation, labor laws and insurance. In some countries, 
the level of decentralization provides the urban officials adequate authority over the PPP 
without sufficient understanding. Confusion on authority, functions and decision 
making within the local government and among several relevant central government 
agencies can make the design, procurement and implementation of PPP projects 
difficult. 
It is necessary for the central government to enforce a clear regulation on when and how 
urban or local governments need consultation with existing regulatory authorities at 
national level, and how the central government should take part in contractual matters 
such as the issues related to pricing and dispute resolution. A good example is South 
Africa, which has a national framework of laws, regulation and administrative processes 
guiding urban governments on the use of PPPs (PPP Manual, South Africa 2004), or 
Germany that has a unit for the coordination of PPP design and management in the 
country (PPP Coordination Unit, Germany, 2006). The primary goal of the PPP 
Coordination Unit is to establish a regulatory framework for public authorities (at the 
national and urban level) related to the application of a range of PPP instruments to 
implement national and urban development strategies; deliver support for PPP projects 
market development; and provide consulting services to local authorities.  
Legal provisions and procedures related to private sector participation in Southeast 
Asian countries are complex, numerous, scattered over many different instruments and 
have no fixed time frame for completion (UNESCAP 2006). To address these problems, 
several governments have established specialized units and devised suitable legal 
instruments to reduce the level of uncertainty surrounding public-private partnership 
projects and increase investor confidence. The Build Operate Transfer Centre (BOTC) 
in the Philippines and the National Committee for the Acceleration of Infrastructure 
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Provision Policy (KKPPI) in Indonesia were established to serve as catalysts for the 
promotion and implementation of private sector participation projects.  
With the national PPP regulation and Coordination Unit in place, there is still a need for 
the central government to support capacity development for local authorities to manage 
the PPP process and have a better understanding of the nature of PPP agreements.  
Governments in South Africa and Germany as well as many others countries maintain 
websites that clearly demonstrate national frameworks to guide PPP development. Other 
initiatives include central and local government created associations and institutions in 
and outside of the state to discuss, evaluate and in some cases promote a more active 
participation of the private sector. It is most advantageous to combine the PPP 
experience at the central government with local government knowledge of the needs and 
priorities of its constituency. When borrowing is involved, central government should 
be consulted as subsequent future liabilities concern the whole nation.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Like other developing countries, the fiscal pressures of local governments in ASEAN 
are more intense, and the prospect of shifting investment responsibility to private 
infrastructure providers has played a more significant role in the increased acceptance of 
private sector involvement in urban infrastructure development.  Partnership enhances 
the strengths of both the public and private sectors in pursuing urban infrastructure 
service delivery. However, the public sector still maintains an obligation to act in the 
public interest in the delivery of public goods, whilst private firms also expect more 
governmental binding agreements and regulations to prevent administration 
expropriation and to secure long-term maximization of profits. As a result, public-
private partnerships are still subject to extensive and complicated bodies of legal 
doctrine and to legal enforcement mechanisms.  
Most developing countries still need to have the regulatory and surveillance machinery 
in place at both national and urban levels to ensure effectiveness, fairness and openness 
of their public-private partnership schemes. They have embraced the PPP concept at the 
national level as a key strategy in overcoming some of the infrastructure backlog at the 
urban level. For some countries, decentralization of PPP implementation may lead to 
confusion and inconsistencies in the frameworks of national government that inhibit 
urban authority action and private sector interest. From the perspective of international 
investors, countries perceived to have inconsistent regulatory and legal frameworks are 
considered unattractive to capital investment. The regulatory framework needs to be 
consistent and harmonized in order to reduce confusion resulting from interpretation of 
sub-national governments that can affect PPP transactions.  
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